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I.

INTRODUCTION

The pre-Socratic thinkers tried to explain reality
by what they saw around them, and their attempts were admirable
however naive.

Heraclitus with his constant tlux and Parmeni-

des with his immutable one indicate the extremes to which their
speculations went.

They were physicists and, as such, they

wanted a theory ot reality which would explain everything materially.

Anaxagoras, whom the Stagirite describes as the only

sober man among the early philosophers, was the first to postulate mind in the world.

It was Aristotle himself who, with

his doctrine of potency and act, pOinted out that there could
be both one and many in nature.

He exposed the limitations ot

his predecessors and synthesised the truths contributed by all

ot them.
Curiously enough, we are facing today in our enlightened age a situation not altogether unlike the epoch before
Socrates.

Modern science has taken over the ph11osophical

tield and the new physics claims to have explained the universe
Having discredited both metaphysics and teleology, conscious
and intelligent design is disdained as hopelessly obsolete!
In tact, any explanation of reality which is not evolutionary
rITeleology,' article by Wm. Fulton, BAstings Encyclopedia ot
Religion and Ethics, Vol. 12, p. 224, N. Y.; 1922. cit. Marling, the Order ot Nature in the Philosophy of St. thomAs
AqUinas, p. 155.

-2is disregarded and stands very little chance of receiving recognition.

Notwithstanding the facts that for many centuries the

world acknowledged Aristotle's four causes as a scientific exposition of nature, contemporary thinkers have preferred the
less perfect theories of the early Greek philosophers.
The philosophy of events as propounded by Bertrand
Russell, Eddington, Sir James Jeans, and the rest, is nothing
more than the flux of Heraclitus.

The mechanistic theories

plainly revert to Democritus, although we ordinarily trace
them only to Descartes, and Spinoza's pantheism is merely a
spiritualized statement of Parmenides' doctrine that there is
only one substance.
-Modern scientists deliberately ignore the origin of
things.

Everything is in process moving from an unknown prin-

ciple to an unpredictable end or rather to no end at all.
Eddington writes, "It may be objected that.we have no right to
dismiss the starting-off as an inessential part of the problem
•••• But that is •••• a problem of the pack, not of the isolated oard. 12

The diffioulty that is here so nonchalantly

passed off is very likely oaused by the fact that the majority
of physioists refuse to admit anything but sense perception
into their knowledge.

Eddington in his introduotion to The

Nature of the PhYsioal World illustrates this by his description of his scientific and familiar tables, where he attempts
2A. S. Eddington The Nature of the PhYsical World, p. 65
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to destroy the idea ot substance and replace it by thinghood
which is in the order ot sense-perceptible.
We may ask just exactly what is an event?

Whitehead

answers it is -the grasping into unity ot a pattern ot aspects~~
For Whitehead nature is composed ot events.
the other hand, everything is one big event~

For Russell, on
In spite ot dif-

terences ot this kind which crop out between various eventists
they all agree that nature is a process.
things as tinal and tormal causes.
an end; it merely operates.

There are no such

Nature does not operate tor

In Thomistic philosophy nature

also operates but the writings ot Aquinas are permeated with
the statement, -guod omne &gens agit propter tinem.-

Nature

develops and untolds in the thought ot St. Thomas as tully as it
does in the doctrine ot

any

champion ot progress, but according

to the Thomistic interpretation everything has a beginning and
an end, and God Himselt operates in nature through the

a~petitue

naturalis to transtorm a static hierarchy ot being into a dynamic ascent to Himself.
Although teleology and causality are anathema among
the greater number ot modern philosophers there are some concessions made to them here and there.

Max Planck, who intro-

duoed the quantum theory so idolized in the new physios, writes
3Soienoe and the Modern World, p. 174.
4Russell, Philosophy, pp. 276-291
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"it is essential tor theheaIthy',development of physics, that
among the postulates of this science we reckon not merely the
existence ot law in general but also the strictly causal character ot that la•• 15

Indeed, it is absurd to aoknowledge a law

without recognizing causality at the same time, and this is precisely what many scientists want to do.

The very fact that

they all admit natural and physical laws would indicate that
their exclusion of causality is nominal, since they unconsciously have recourse to the principles ot causality in their practical experiments.

Moderns complain that the idea ot causality

is vague and hard to grasp.

This is because they consider it

only in the light ot experience.

St. Thomas did not have this

ditticulty, tor causality was tor him a metaphysical idea and,
as such a manner ot being he contemplated it.
Practically all current philosophy is stamped with an
evolutionary character.
homocentric.

It it isoentered on anything it is

St. Thomas is definitely theo-centric in his

world view, tor God is both First Cause and Final End ot all
creatures.

All things move toward Him and the appetitus natur-

alis is the reason tor this movement in the universe.
It is the purpose of this thesis to study the place
of the appetitus naturalis in Thomistic thought.

It is, indeed

the principle in nature which 1s responsible tor the order 1n
~Planck, the Universe 1n tge L2ght of Modern Physics, p. 84,
cit. Marling, opus cit., p. 141.

j

-5-

the universe.

Before examining this principle in particular,

however, it is necessary to understand that St. Thomas insisted
on finality in ·the world.

All things work toward ends, and

they do so by mesns of their va.rious appetites.

From this

standpoint, the working of things toward ends, appetites generally, and the appetitus na.turalis, as such, will be discussed.

-6-

II. ALL THINGS WORK TOWARD ENDS
According to St. Thomas Hemne agens agit propter
bonum,-l and the good is that Which all thlngs seek.

A creature

then, only desires an end ln so far as it is good, or at least
appears to be good, for lntelllgent beings move toward a good
through the will which desires good, as such.

Irratlonal belngs

on the other hand, must seek an end ln one of two ways:

elther

by an intelligent agent dlrecting lt or by a prlnciple put into
lts nature by the Flrst Cause.

An arrow flylng toward a target

ls dlreoted ln its movement by the archer, but a stone falllng
to the earth ls moved by its natural lncllnatlon, .and thls
inclination ls an
Creator.

lnt~lnsic

princlple placed ln the belng by the

However, the movement by wh1chthe arrow goes to the

target ls outside its nature and ls somewhat violent.

• The

natural necesslty lnherent in those thlngs whlch are determ1ned
to a partlcular thing ls a klnd of impression from God direotlng them to their end; as the necessity whereby an arrow ls
moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an lmpression
from the archer, and not from the arrow.

But there is a dif-

ference inasmuoh as that whlch creatures recelve from God is
their nature, Wh1le that whioh natural things receive from man
inaddltion to their nature is somewhat violent.

Wherefore, as

the violent necesslty ln the movement of the arrow shows the
~s!

C. G. III,

3
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action of the archer, so the natural necessity of things shows
the government of Divine Providence~2
Now objects tend toward definite ends, for if they
did not they would not do one thing rather than another.
"Everything that tends definitely to an end, either fixes its
own end or has its end fixed for it by another:

otherwise it

would not tend rather to this end than to that.

But the oper-

ations of nature tend to definite ends."3

Such indifference

would cancel the efficacy of activity and nothing would be produced in nature at all.

Therefore, action must be directed.

One might suppose that action is directed by chance, but if
this were so the gains of nature would not be the rule rather
than the exceptions and the fact that they are is apparent
from the order in the universe.

Moreover, because we do not

see deliberation taking place we must not conclude that thereis
no purpose.

As Aristotle said, this is absurd.

deliberate.

If the shipbuilding art were in the wood, it would

produce the same results by nature.

Art does not

If, therefore, it is pres-

ent in art, it is present also in nature~

It is clear, then,

that there must bea definite purpose to an action even if the
action is done for its own sake~ for to every act there must be
two termini - a beginning and an end, and the end is that for
2

3S. Theol. q.103, a.l, ad 3

S. C. G.

I, 44

4Phls. 11, 8 , 199b
5·S.C~Qt. III, 2
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which the action is done.
What is it, then, that a thing seeks?

Everything

seeks its own perfection,. and in doing so a being is tending
to a good, for a thing is good inasmuch as it is perfect.

Fur-

thermore, as a thing tends to be good it moves toward the divine likeness - for God is Supreme Goodness, the Summum Bonum.
Now a particular good is appetible because it resembles the
First Goodness.

Therefore, a thing in seeking its own good is

seeking the divine likeness, and it tends to its own good for
the sake of the divine likeness?

Hence it follows that all

things in reality seek the same Last End, namely, God.

It is

on this doctrine of finality that the Thomistic teleology rest&
St. Thomas re-formulated the ideas of Aristotle on
nature working for ends.

The philosopher tells us that in na-

ture all things are conducive to ends, for an end is present in
all things which come to be and are by nature?

Although peo-

ple often discuss whether such active creatures as spiders,
ants, etc., work by intelligence or some other faculty, still
we see even in plants that is produced which will be for the
sake of an end - the leaves growing to provide shade for the
fruit, the roots growing down into the ground seeklng mOisture,
and so forth.

There ls, then, qulte evidently a cause opera-

ting in nature, and since nature means matter and form of
which the latter ls the end of the former, and since all the
5

7 S. C. G. III, 24
Phys. idem, 199a
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rest is for the sake of the end, the form must be the cause in
the sense of that tor the sake ot which~

Here Aristotle has

the idea of a first cause being at the same time final end, and,
of course; in Thomism this notion becomes fundamental.

Sphys.

idem, 199a

-10III.
St.

APPETITE

!homas conceives nature from two aspects:

first

as a static hierarchy ot beingf and secondly, as a dynamic
ascent of th1s be1ng to God~

The force which converts the for-

mer into the latter 1s appetite, the tendency 1n an object toward something ordained~

All th1ngs have appet1tes accord1ng

to their vary1ng natures and all ultimately seek the Same Last
End, God, s1nce all des1re the fulfillment 'of the1r perfect10n~
Although we say appetite moves things toward their ends,

St.

Thomas says it 1s not the cause of movement merely 1n the sense
of change of place or of quality, for generation and destruction
are movements too~

ThUS, appet1te 1s the cause of motion and

rest 1n nature.
Appet1te, then, 1s really des1re, the crav1ng of a
thing to ach1eve the fulness of 1ts be1ng.

Hence, appetite 1s

a potency for someth1ng that 1s lacking 1n a being.

It 1s sat-

1sfied only when the object of des1re 1s reached and the appetit1ve subject 1s thus ontologically enriched.

A being des1res

~S. Theol. q.47, a3 ad 2; DeVeritate q.29, a.3 ad 3
3s.d.G. I, 74
DeVer1tate, q.22, a.l "1 .. ,guas1 tender§ 1n aligu1d, ad 1psum
40rd1nantur."

s.d.G. ttl, 16

5In t De Anima, St. Thomas lect. 6; Sert1llanges. St. Thomas d l
Agu1n, v.2, p.30
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somethlng that lt lacks, slnce .1t would have no need of deslrlng what lt already has.

However, as Sertlllanges polnts out,

we must ln some way possess lt before we seek lt, for the good
sought must ln some way be apprehended, as one must know a
thlng before he can deslre It.

"You would not search for me,

lf you had not already found me.,6

From thls lt ls clear that

there ls a relatlon between an appetlte and the degree of
edge ln the belng to Whlch lt belongs.

know~

Therefore, ln the human

soul there are as many appetltlve powers as there are cognltlve,
that ls two, for the soul apprehends objects by means of a sensitive and an lntellectual faculty.

But the power of apprehen-

sion ls distlnct from the appetltive potency for lt has not the
characterlstlc of movement.

The act of apprehendlng ls flnlsh-

ed only when the object has passed into the power apprehendlng
lt but the appetlte completes lts funotlon by merely tendlng
towards an objeot?
There are three dlfferent klnds of appetlte:
sensltlve (anlmal), and ratlonal.

natura~

The natural appetlte ls that

lncllnatlon everythlng has of lts own nature for somethlng
sultable to ltself.
good apprehended~

But the anlmal appetlte results from the
Ratlonal appetlte ls strlctly ln the lntel-

lectual order and ls, therefore, the hlghest deslre of the

6 Sertll1anges, opus .. clt., p. 191; St. Thomas, DeVerltate, q.22,
7 a.l , ad 3 e t ad 4
8 Gllson, opus cl t. pp. 285-288
S. Theol. q. 78, a.l, ad 3
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highest creatures in the material universe, men, truly the
ambassadors between heaven and earth.
When St. Thomas adopted the Aristotelian explanation
of nature with the theory of potency and act, he marked all
activities With the imprimatur of teleology.

Even mere matter

craves to become something and it is actualized when it receives a torm.

Some inclination follows every torm~

Fire

because of its torm is inclined to rise and beget fire in the
bodies with which it comes in contact.

Just as there is a

h!erarchy of being in the philosophy of St. Thomas so there is
a hierarchy ot forms, and the torms are more perfect in beings
with knowledge than in those deVOid of it~O

For in beings

without knowledge the form determines being only to its nature.
Hence, the natural form is followed by a natural inclination
which is called the natural appetite;l

But in the case of

beings with knowledge the form is receptive of the species
other things.

ot

Therefore, the senses can receive all things

sensible and the intellect all things intelligible.

Consequent4

ly, the soul of man through knowledge can become all things
since it can receive the forms of all intelligible reality.
Since, then, all things knowable can exist in the mind of man,
in this respect man attains to the divine likeness, for all
9 S• ~eol. q.80, a.l
S.
eol. q.80, a.l
lS. Theol. q.80, a.l

-13things pre-exist in the mind of God.

Furthermore, as forms

exist in things endowed'with knowledge in a higher way than in
things devoid of knowledge, and since the former are superior
to the latter, there must be in the former an inclination surpassing the natural appetite.

This superior inclination is a

potency of the soul through which the animal desires what it
apprehends as well as that to which it is naturally inclined~2
Moreover, the higher the appetite the wider will be its range,
for the nearer a nature is to God the less it will be determined by Him and the more it will determine itself.

Therefore,

things without knowledge are merely determined b¥ their appetites to particular ends; they are directed only by their natural inclinations - nothing more.

Thus the arrow is directed

and set in motion by the archer;

the stone falls naturally to

the ground}3
Ascending from natural appetite the next step toward
God is the sensitive appetite.
different potencies!

Now sensuality includes two

the concupiscible and the

irascible~

The

natural appetite does nothing more than obey the fundamental
precept of the natural law:
what is harmful.

seek what is suitable and avoid

The sensitive does more than this.

It tends

to resist what is contrary to the suitable and what is a threat
with the harmful!4

The coneupiscible potency is that Which

12
138. Theol. q.80, a.l
l4De Veritate, q.22, a.l
In III De Anima. St. Thomas, lect. 14

-14seeks what sense perception presents as suitable and avoids
what the senses present as harmful~5

The irascible potency is

that which strives against what opposes the suitable or threatens with the hurtful~6

These two potencies are frequently in

opposition to each other and in this way act as a protection to
each other, for anger lessens concupiscence, concupiscence
anger!7
Now just as the natural and sensual appetites are
both present in animals, so they together with the rational
appetite are present in man.

In the beast the sensitive appe-

tite, being a potency of the soul, is subject to what is called
the vis aestimativa, that faculty by which the sheep fears the
wolf and the bird uses grass and twigs.to build its nest.

In

the case of man, however, the sensual appetite, belonging to
that part of the soul wherein reside the intellect and will, is
subject to the particular reason which St. Thomas calls the
cogitative}8

Although sensuality is subject·to the particular

reason, it is superior to the natural appetite since it is not
merely determined to one object but to all that is suitable to
it.

But in man the reason must first apprehend the good in

order to desire one object rather than another}9
The appetitive power of the soul is passive inasmuch
i:ln
De
l7%n
lSZn
19S.

III De Anima, St. Thomas, lect. 14
Kalo L q.8, a.3
III ve Anima. locus cit.
II De Anima, St. Thomas, lect. 13
Theol. q.8l, a.5; De Veritate, q.25, a.2
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as it is moved by a good apprehended?O

!he rational appetite

is moved by the universal good as opposed to the particular

good~l

Moreover, the rational appetite is active insofar as it

is an act of the will impelling the intellect.

The will, then,

must desire what it apprehends as good by the very necessity ot
its nature, Whioh is to desire the good?2

Therefore, the in-

tellectual appetite is different from the sensitive appetite
because the object of intellect is different from the object ot
sense.

The reason that the will can transcend individual ends
is that it is strictly immateria1 23 and is an inclination consequent on the torm understood.

Therefore, the will, being a

tendency to universal good, can include all things.
It has been pointed out that both sensitive and rational appetites are composed of two parts:

The first of the

concupiscible and irascible potencies; the second of intellect
and will.

But the natural appetite, likewise,has two manifes-

tations, namely, the active and the passive.

The passive func

tion tries to preserve the thing in nature by maintaining what
it needs.

The active operation tends to destroy whatever

threatens the being.

Furthermore, all corrupt1l:>l-e beings must

battle victoriously against hostile elements or be destroyed
~~In III De Anima St. Thomas, leot. 14
22St. Theol. I-II, q.l, a.2, ad 3
23S. Theol. q.82, a.l
Theol. q.87, a.4

s.

-16by them~4

Theref'ore, the active operat10n of the naturalappe-

t1te 1s h1gher than the pass1ve.

Here we see carried out aga1n

that orderly h1erarchy so fundamental 1n the Thom1st1c synthes1s.

There 1s a gradat10n w1th1n the appetites correspond1ng

to the degrees of' perf'ect10n 1n the natural, sens1t1ve, and
rat10nal 1nc11nat10ns themselves.

This 1s the var1ety 1n un1-

formity which makes the very pass1ng of things 1n the un1verse
a thing of beauty.
To d1st1ngu1sh further the relat10n of every potency
to its proper object, we may say that the proper object of the
natural appet1te is th1s th1ng as such; of the sens1t1ve, this
th1ng as su1table; and of the rational, good 1n general. Hence,
the natural appet1te seeks merely to preserve its nature; sensua11ty 1s concerned w1th a good th1ng; and rat10nal appetite
des1res· good, as euch?5

Nevertheless, the h1gher appet1te

moves only through the mediat10n of the lower and 1s thereby
dependent upon the lower~6

In th1s sense, the natural appe-

tite 1s more un1versal than its super10rs s1nce 1t 1s common
to all created th1ngs 1n so far as they ex1st at all, whereas,
the sens1t1ve appet1te is found only 1n an1mals and man, the
rat10nal 1n man alone.

Therefore, we may say that all appet1t

1s dependent on the appetitus natura11s and consequently this
natural inc11nat1on must be the pr1m1t1ve mov1ng force 1n na~~G11S0n, locus c1t.: S. Theol. q.8l, a.2

S Theol I-II, q.22
26 In
III De An1ma, St. Thomas, lect. 15, 16
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ture.

It 1s by means of the appet1tes generally that St. Thoma I

br1dges the ohasm between the f1n1te and the Inf1n1te.

-18IV.

THE APPETITUS NATURALIS

In treat1ng the appet1tus natura11s, as such, 1t may
be well to consider a Lat1n phrase wh1chw8.S used by many ph1losophers from the beg1nn1ng of the th1rteenth century and culminated with Sp1noza 1n the Seventeenth, namely, "natura natur~

- natura naturata."l

It is thought that this expression

was introduced into Western Europe by the Arabian philosophers,
particularly through the translation of Averroes' Commentary on
Aristotle.

When the Arabic wr1t1ngs were being translated the

interpreters merely wrote the l1teral Latin word above each
Arabic word.

In the translation into Latin then natura is used

to substitute for

I» tr~s. •

Although th1s expression appears fairly often in the
works of the great Schoolmen of the thirteenth century it was
not courted with great favor and St. Thomas himself uses natura
naturata not at all and natura naturans only twice~

Moreover,

lFor the historical background of th1s term the writer is indebted to an article by Henry A. Lucks, "Natura Naturans Natura Naturata,· The New Scholast1c1sm, v. IX, no. 1, 1935;
also to The Order of Nature, Joseph Mar11ng, C. PP. S., ch. I,
2.

2Sum.Theol. I-II, q.85, a.6 "Natura v§ro un1v§rsalls est v1rtus
act1va in a11quQ universa11 principio natura§, puta 1n aliquo
caelestium corp orum , vel a11cuJus super10ris substantiae,
secundym quod et1am Deus a qu1busdam dicitur natura naturgns;
In Dlv. Nom. 4, 21 "Est autem Deus yniversa11s causa ominum,
quae natyra11ter flunt, unde §t gu1dem lpsum nominant
naturentem."

-19when the Scholastics use this expression at all they do so with
a very orthodox connotation.

Natura naturans clearly means God,

the Efficient Cause in nature, and natura naturata denotes
created nature.

This is a very different interpretation indeed

from the Pantheistic view of Spinoza when he employs the same
terminology.
In spite of the fact that John of St. Thomas referred
to nat.ura naturans as a "vocabulo asperiore, ,3

the Schoolmen

really had precedents for this distinction if not for the phrase
itself.

Scotus Eringena had analyzed -natura quae creat et non

areatur; natura quae creatur et creat; natura quae creatur et
non creat; natura quae nee creatur nec creat. n4 Furthermore,
St. Augustine, the most revered authority in Christian philosophy before St. Thomas, spoke of natura creatrix5 by which he
meant what the Scholastics designated by natura naturans, God.
~e

reason that this discussion is brought in here is

that the purposes of this thesis is to Show that the appetitus
naturalis is the motivating force operating in natura naturata
by ·the grace of natura naturans for the sake of establishing
order in the universe.

St. Thomas tells us that nature is seen

to operate Wisely and that operation to be wise must be ordered
for it is proper to wisdom that all things be disposed in order~
~Phil. Nat. I, P.O. IX1 Art. I, pp. 148-9, Vives Ed., Paris,18a~

De Divisione Naturae ~ib. I No.1. Uigne P. L. 122:411
5De Trivitate, XV, d.l, n.l J\.igne P.L. 42:1057)
60puscula II Mandonnet, (Edit. Rom. XXXIV), De Operationibus
Occultia Naturae Ad Quemdam Militem Ultra Montanum.

r
-20When we speak of natural appetite we refer to an inclination inherent in a thing without being oaused by anything
out~ide,

for that is natural to a thing whioh has been put into

it by God; and when a thing is moved naturally it is moved "~
interiori prinoipio. la
The appetitus naturalis is fundamental in nature for
it is the means by whioh things devoid of knowledge seek their
ends. The referenoes in St. Thomas to this inherent natural
foroe are frequent and he desoribes it in various ways.

It is

a natural neoessity, a kind of impression from God in those
beings determined to a partioular end, direoting them to their
end as the neoessity, whereby an arrow is moved so as to fly
towards a

cert~in

point, is an impression from the aroher and

not from the arrow~

Again St. Thomas says "the natural appe-

tite is that inclination everything has, of its

own

nature, for

something suitable to itself. 110
Now even things devoid of knowledge oan work for an
end and desire good through the natural appetite~l

But in

working toward their end they seek both their own perfection
and the divine likeness.

Now whether a thing is seeking its

own perfection or the divine likeness it is desiring a good its own particular good or the Summua Bonum.

Since, therefore,

7S. C. G., III, 100
~St.Thos. In Phys. Arist. Lib. VIII, IV, 6
S. Theol., q.103, a.l, ad 3
i~ibid. 1, q.7a, a.l
~G. III, 24; De Veritate q.22, q.lj S. Theol. I-II,q.l,a.2
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all things are good only in so far as they participate in the
Supreme Goodness, it follows that all things are ordered to
that Goodness, and St. Thomas says, Homnia ordinantur in
finem. qui est Deus." 12

unum

Everything that exists at all has some

perfection in its very being and the tendency inherent in its
nature is to become as actualized as it can.

However, being

is either an end in and for itself or it is finalized in some
complete being, and since God is the source of all being He
must necessarily be the end toward which it tendst 3

God, then,

is the first cause in the order of final causes just as He is
14
highest in the order of goods.
Furthermore, all creatures
want to become godlike, Homnia intendunt assimilari Deo. n15
It is because of this desire implicit in all nature that in
the hierarchy of being all higher beings are dependent upon the
lower, yet each species having someth1ng more than its inferiors, by that very superiority, raises the lower above its inferior level and brings it nearer to God.

This is the most

profound law of the finite - to possess the Infinite,'

Hence,

the ultimate end of all things being to become gOdlike, beings
seek this end according to their own natures~6

It is this com-

mon desire of all creatures for God which makes the uniformity
12 .
13S.C.G. III, 17
O'Mahony opus cit., p.90; also Post.Anal. Lib I, lect. 13;
l4Metaph. Lib V, lect. 3.
I S.C.G. III, 17
BS.C.G. III, 19
ISS.C.G. III, 20

-22in nature; their seeking Him in the manner oonsonant with their
individual natures gives variation to the tapestry of the universe.

This is the progress which the evolutionists see in the

world and are unable to explain.

Because they fail to perceive

or deliberat,ely ignore the fact that every action must have two
termini - a principle and an end - they try to solve the apparent difficulty of change and becoming by a theory of inevitable
progress never to be terminated.
than this.

St. Thomas was more astute

He saw God as the Alpha and the Omega of all things

and man as the epitome of creation, through whose mediation all
lower beings, impelled by the appetitus naturalis, attain their
final end.
Granted that all beings seek their ends through the
natural appetite the question arises how is it that these particular ends sought by individual objects do not conflict?

The

stone falling into its proper plaoe in the universe; the fire
rising to communicate its form; the seed growing into the sturdy plant; the egg developing into the ohicken; none of these
interferes with the others.

The Saint explains that the part

loves the whole more than itself and therefore works harmoniously with other parts for the sake of the whole!?

Moreover,

that this is so is evident from experience since we perceive in
Hthe external finality of nature the adaptation of species to
one another. HIS
I'lSumrna Theol. I-II, q.I09, a.3
18Marling, opus cit., p.62

-23We say that natural things develop in obedience to
certain principles which scientists call natural laws.

This is

the inner order in objects to which St. Augustine refers when
he says, IA-rno est, inquit, per quem aguntur omnia quae Deu@
consti tui t. !f19

Inasmuch as all beings act according to .their

natures and seek the divine likeness, 'all creation is the expression of God's nature as it can be im1tated beyond Himself.
Therefore, all creatures, animate and 1nanimate, act according
to certain rules in the view of given ends.

These rules we

call the natural law, and the natural law is one manifestation
of the eternal law by which God willed the universe. 20

Hence,

the natural law, as such, 1s the orderly process nature follows
in carrying on its activities and since the aHpetitus naturalis
is the motivating force in natural objects it is the mode
according to which irrational creatures part1c1pate in the etep
nal law.
sonable?l

Now St. Thomas insists ,that law is essentially reaHis famousdef1n1tion of law has become proverbial

among Scholastics:

it 1s a certain reasonable order for the

common good, promulgated by one who has the authority to care
for the commun1ty~2, Therefore, St. Thomas would inSist, law
can be applied to the irrational universe only analogously~3
19
20De Ordine, I, 10, 28, P.L. 32:991
21Gilson, 0HuS c1t., p. 327
22S. Theol. I-II, q.90, a.4; I-II, q.97, a.3
23S. Theol. I-II, q.90 ibid.
Marling, 0HuS cit., p. 83
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In commenting on the Pseudo - Dionysius the Angelic Doctor,
however, appears to ident1fy the appetitus naturalis with the
'>

naturales leges for he says, the very natural inclinations
themselves which impel things to their proper ends and are consonant with the effect of the natural appetite we call the natural laws?4
sense of

~

Furthermore, the Saint uses ~ naturae in the
naturae since the order of nature follows direct-

ly from the promulgated natural laws.

Also these natural laws

are sanctioned, for if by design or accident certain irrational
bodies are prevented from reaching their end this failure results in their destruction.

Prof. Gilson says that in the

event that certain bodies are prevented/trom meeting the requirements of their nature they suffer in their substance as
well as their operations and they are destroyed.

Nor, he con-

tinues, is this either a consequence of the disorder which prevents

them from following their inherent tendencies or an ac-

cidental complement of this disorder.

It is, on the other han

a part of the situation in which the body is placed as a result
of this disorder, and death or destruction of the animal of obJect so situated is the very thing that re-establishes order in
the disorder.

Moreover, since nothing can escape the law and

everything which attempts to perishes inasmuch as it succeeds,
the persistent being of the body that obeys the law and the
destruction of the body that defies it is the moral sanction of
~4In De Div. Nom., X, I

-25the natural law~5
It has been noted that St. Thomas identifies the natural appetite with the natural law and both with the order of
nature.

Consequently, the appetitus naturalis must be the in-

trinsic cause of the harmony and regularity in nature.

Since,

then, it is God who has endowed creatures with their natural
inclinations, He must be the extrinsic Efficient Cause in the
universe.

Here is the orthodox Scholastic conception of Natura

Naturans - natura naturata.
But what about the case of miracles?

In this case

would the natural appetite be destroyed if it were thus impeded
from its natural effect?

St. Thomas says it is very difficult

to oppose the laws of nature~6

But in the Summa Contra Gentites

IV, 55, he says it is proper to God to change the laws of natura
~at
~rue,

happens in a miracle?

God merely suspends the natural laws.

this suspension would prevent the natural appetite from

!having its effect but it would in no way destroy or impair that
~ppetite

itself, for its

~ature.

Moreover, miracles illustrate a higher law than that of

the relative,

na~ely,

destructio~

would be that of its very

the metaphysical dependence of the finite

on the Infinite Who transcends the relations of contingency
~ound on the plane of the re1ative~7

. ~5
~6Gi1son, opus cit., p. 331
b7In II Sent., d.9, q.1, a.3
~ O'Mahony, opus cit., p. 87

-26-

From the lowest creature in which matter desires form
to the highest which sees God Himself, an overwhelming urge
permeates nature and makes it go of itself to God.

The~

titus naturalis, therefore, is the divine dynamo 10 the ascent
of being.

Now God is the first desire of all beings because

they love Him~8

It is an Augustinian idea that it is love

which makes the stone, for example, fall into its proper place
in the universe, for love is a tendency towards an object desired.

Nevertheless, this is also a Thomistic notion, for

Aqui~as says God is the first desire of all things~9

God created the universe freely and essences are the
gratuitous gifts of the Divine Goodness.
is an overflow of the Divine Love~O

In this sense nature

Moreover, God did not

merely create beings and then abandon them.

He preserves them

and cares for them by His Divine Providence which is shown by
the natural necessity of things~l

Furthermore, St. Thomas says

lit belongs to the Divine Goodness, as it brought things into
eXistence, so to lead them to their end: and this is to govern. 132 Although God created the world through His Love, wishing thereby to communicate His Own goodness, He did not give up

28S. Theol. I-II, q.109, a.3
29S.C.G. I, 37
30This is only apparently similar to the neo~Platonic doctrine
, of emanation, for creation was an act of God's free will and
3lwhat He created is essentially distinct from Himself.
2S. Theol., q.103, a.l, ad 3
3 S. Theol., q.103, a.l

-27anything of Himself in the sense of losing anything when He endowed beings with their individual natures.

Creatures did, on

the other hand, acquire their essence and existence from Him.
Therefore, what God put 1nto beings essent1ally was a love of
Himself which would move them to seek Him Who loved them first.
This progress toward unity so manifest in the universe is
caused by the love of God 1nscribed in creatures, and the
Angelic Doctor tells us, "In aDpet1tu autem naturali princ1pium
hu'usmodi motus est QOnnaturalitas appetentis ad id quod tendet
quae dici potest §mor natural1s."33

Therefore, the appetituB

naturalis must be this love of nature for God.

Now irrational

creatures are driven by their own bias rather than act for
themselves 34 but the natural love in all things is caused by an
outside intelligence not existing in natural things but in Him
Who oreates them~5

Since intelligence rules the destinies of

lower orders it is really through the intellect of created beinl
that the irrational approaches the Divine Intelligence.

Hence,

it is in the mind of man that the natural tendency towards God
sees the light of consciousness, and it is the human intellect
that gives meaning and imparts perfection to nature, bringing
it from the potency of intelligibility to the actuality of
being known~6
g~s. Theol., I-II, q.26, a.l

35S.C.G. IV, 55
368. Theol. I-II, q.27, a.2, ad 3
QIMahony, opus clt., pp.l02,103
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Since, as has been shown, God draws creatures toward
Himself as the Object of

th~ir

desire, and since the natural

appetite is the very love of God, we can say with Dante that
all beings seek their ends "by that Love impelled that moves
the sun in heaven and all the stars."

v.

CONCLUSION

Contrary to modern theor1es of real1ty St. Thomas expla1ns the universe by h1s doctr1ne of finality.
F1rst Cause and F1nal End of all things.

God 1s the

Be1ngs w1th and w1th-

out knowledge work toward def1n1te ends, str1v1ng always to
fulf111 the1r own perfection and thus atta1n the divine 11keness.
St. Thomas sees being as a h1erarchy from matter up
to God, with all creatures des1r1ng H1m through the1r proper
appet1te.

The appet1tus natura11s alone is un1versal.

inherent 1n all created be1ng.

It 1s

It is the very love wh1ch 1m-

pels every nature to seek 1ts end, and as such a love, 1t 1s
the intrins1c cause of the harmony and regular1ty 1n the un1verse.

Hence, the Thom1st1c concept of the operations in na-

ture 1s markedly purpos1ve, postulat1ng God as the Beginning
and the End of everyth1ng.
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